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I. Introduction 
Courts have long struggled with the question of when 
American antitrust laws apply to foreign anticompetitive 
conduct.1 The precise extraterritorial reach of U.S. antitrust laws 
remains uncertain as the global economy becomes increasingly 
interdependent and international trade barriers evaporate.2 
Courts face the daunting task of balancing two competing 
interests: (1) encouraging vigorous antitrust enforcement against 
                                                                                                     
 1. See Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 353–58 (1909) 
(considering the extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act for the first 
time since the statute’s enactment).  
 2. See Robert D. Sowell, New Decisions Highlight Old Misgivings: A 
Reassessment of the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act Following 
Minn-Chem, 66 FLA. L. REV. 511, 511 (2014) (evaluating the extraterritorial 
reach of U.S. antitrust law); see also Diane P. Wood, Foreword to MARK R. 
JOELSON, AN INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST PRIMER, at xi, xi (2d ed. 2001) (“The 
volume of international transactions has exploded: old political barriers to trade 
and commerce have fallen; and the world of cyberspace is quickly erasing what 
is left of national boundaries for economic purposes.”). 
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anticompetitive conduct that harms American commerce and 
(2) accommodating the antitrust regimes of foreign nations.3  
The Sherman Act4 makes illegal every contract, combination, 
or conspiracy in restraint of interstate or foreign commerce.5 
Congress enacted the statute in 1890 to “secure equality of 
opportunity to protect the public against evils commonly incident 
to destruction of competition through monopolies and 
combinations in restraint of trade.”6 Soon thereafter, the question 
arose as to whether and to what extent the Sherman Act applied 
extraterritorially.7 At first, the U.S. Supreme Court strictly 
limited the Sherman Act’s application to when conduct occurred 
overseas.8 Some years later, Judge Learned Hand took a different 
approach, declaring that the Sherman Act applies to foreign 
conduct that has an “effect” on U.S. commerce.9 Subsequent 
judicial applications of Judge Hand’s “effects test” produced 
varied expressions of the standard and created confusion among 
courts and the antitrust community.10 
In 1982, Congress enacted the Foreign Trade Antitrust 
Improvements Act11 (FTAIA) with the intention of clarifying the 
                                                                                                     
 3. See Makan Delrahim, Drawing the Boundaries of the Sherman Act: 
Recent Developments in the Application of the Antitrust Laws to Foreign 
Conduct, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SERV. AM. L. 415, 430–31 (2005) (summarizing the 
problems associated with balancing interests when evaluating the 
extraterritorial reach of the antitrust laws). 
 4. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
 5. Id. 
 6. Charles A. Ramsay Co. v. Associated Bill Posters, 260 U.S. 501, 512 
(1923). 
 7. See Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 359 (1909) 
(analyzing the Sherman Act’s extraterritorial reach for the first time). 
 8. See id. at 355–56 (refusing to apply U.S. antitrust laws to conduct 
occurring in Panama and Costa Rica).  
 9. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 443–44 (2d 
Cir. 1945) (articulating a two-part “effects test” in which American antitrust 
laws may reach foreign conduct that intended to affect and actually effected 
domestic commerce). 
 10. See H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, at 2 (1982) (noting that “courts differ[ed] in 
their expression[s] of the proper test”); Max Huffman, A Retrospective on 
Twenty-Five Years of the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act, 44 HOUS. L. 
REV. 285, 310–13 (2007) (discussing the confusion resulting from different 
phrasings of the effects test). 
 11. 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2012). 
492 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 489 (2016) 
international reach of U.S. antitrust laws.12 The FTAIA provides 
that foreign conduct is outside of the scope of the Sherman Act 
unless it “has a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable 
effect” on domestic or import commerce and “such effect gives rise 
to a claim under the [Sherman Act].”13 Since the FTAIA’s 
passage, courts and practitioners alike have struggled to 
determine the meaning of the word “direct.”14 In a globalized 
economy, the precise meaning of direct becomes even more 
elusive—and even more significant—in the face of complex 
corporate structures and elaborate supply chains that span 
numerous countries.15 
A split amongst the U.S. Courts of Appeals has emerged 
regarding the proper test for determining whether foreign 
conduct has a sufficiently direct effect on U.S. commerce to 
trigger application of the Sherman Act.16 The U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit says an effect is direct if it follows 
as an “immediate consequence” of the anticompetitive conduct.17 
Meanwhile, the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Second and 
Seventh Circuits have endorsed a different standard in which 
directness requires a “reasonably proximate causal nexus” 
between conduct and effect.18 The U.S. Supreme Court has yet to 
weigh in. 
                                                                                                     
 12. See H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, at 2 (seeking to clarify the Sherman Act’s 
reach with respect to international transactions). 
 13. 15 U.S.C. § 6a (emphasis added). 
 14. See ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, REPORT & RECOMMENDATIONS 
225 (2007), http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/report_recommendation/chapter 
2.pdf (“The complex wording of [the FTAIA], however, has also resulted in 
ambiguities. The territorial scope of the Sherman Act and who may bring a 
claim under it thus remains unclear.”). 
 15. See Delrahim, supra note 3, at 415 (discussing the need for antitrust 
laws to respond to the “increasing interdependency of the global economy”); see 
also Gary B. Born, A Reappraisal of the Extraterritorial Reach of U.S. Law, 24 
LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 1, 74 (1992) (“The growing significance of international 
trade and investment has increasingly led the United States and other nations 
to devote regulatory attention to conduct occurring abroad.”). 
 16. See infra Part III (discussing the diverging tests for direct effect). 
 17. See United States v. LSL Biotechnologies, 379 F.3d 672, 680 (9th Cir. 
2004) (articulating the immediate consequence test). 
 18. See Lotes Co. v. Hon Hai Precision Indus. Co., 753 F.3d 395, 398 (2d 
Cir. 2014) (adopting the reasonably proximate causal nexus test); Minn-Chem, 
Inc. v. Agrium Inc., 683 F.3d 845, 857 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (same). 
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This Note considers whether the proper test for a direct effect 
under the FTAIA is (1) if the effect follows as an immediate 
consequence of the anticompetitive conduct, as the Ninth Circuit 
has held, or (2) if there is a reasonably proximate causal nexus 
between the conduct and the effect, as the Second and Seventh 
Circuits have held. Ultimately, this Note recommends that courts 
adopt the reasonably proximate causal nexus test because (1) it is 
an appropriate construction of the statutory language given the 
FTAIA’s purpose and history and (2) it provides the flexibility 
necessary to address anticompetitive conduct in the context of a 
complex global economy. Part II first describes the development 
of extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust law. It then 
summarizes the FTAIA’s enactment and significant 
interpretations. Part III presents the diverging interpretations of 
what constitutes a direct effect under the FTAIA. Part IV 
evaluates the merits of each test and argues that the reasonably 
proximate causal nexus test is the superior standard. Finally, 
Part V urges courts to consider important policy concerns when 
interpreting the FTAIA. 
II. History of U.S. Antitrust Law’s Extraterritorial Reach  
Section 1 of the Sherman Act declares that “[e]very contract, 
combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce 
among the several States, or with foreign nations” is illegal.19 
Enacted in 1890, the Sherman Act avows to “preserve[] free and 
unfettered competition”20 and to “protect United States 
consumers from the consequences of anticompetitive conduct.”21 
A textual analysis of Section 1 reveals that Congress 
intended the Sherman Act to extend to at least some foreign 
commerce.22 Commerce “with” foreign nations refers to “business 
                                                                                                     
 19. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
 20. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958). 
 21. LSL Biotechnologies, 379 F.3d at 693 (Aldisert, J., dissenting); see also 
Joseph P. Bauer, The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act: Do We Really 
Want to Return to American Banana?, 65 ME. L. REV. 3, 5 (2012) (describing the 
purposes of the Sherman Act as “enhancement of consumer welfare, the 
promotion of competition, and compensation of the victims of antitrust 
violations”). 
 22. See 1B PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN 
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transactions between some portion of the United States and a 
foreign country, going in either direction.”23 This is made clear 
when juxtaposed with Congress’s use of “among” to refer to 
interstate commerce.24 Congress certainly intended the Sherman 
Act to apply to commerce between individual states, but it did not 
intend for it to apply to commerce between two foreign nations.25 
Thus, the Sherman Act may reach foreign commerce. The 
question remains, however, exactly when such foreign activity 
comes within the Sherman Act’s scope. 
A. The Sherman Act’s Extraterritorial Reach Before 1982 
The Supreme Court first addressed the Sherman Act’s 
extraterritorial reach in American Banana Co. v. United Fruit 
Co.26 In American Banana, an Alabama corporation alleged that 
a New Jersey corporation engaged in anticompetitive activity in 
Panama and Costa Rica.27 The Court concluded the Sherman Act 
did not extend to conduct occurring abroad.28 Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes recognized the importance of respecting a 
sovereign nation’s authority over acts occurring within its own 
jurisdiction.29 The Court articulated the “territoriality test,” 
                                                                                                     
ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 272a, at 274–75 
(3d ed. 2006) (summarizing the Sherman Act’s applicability to foreign conduct).  
 23. Id. ¶ 272a, at 275. 
 24. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (prohibiting anticompetitive activity “among the 
several States” (emphasis added)); see also AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 
22, ¶ 272i, at 286 (noting the absence of “express authority to regulate 
commerce ‘among’ foreign nations”).  
 25. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 22, ¶ 272i, at 286 (“[T]he 
language would not obviously reach commerce from, say, Ecuador to Germany, 
for that would ordinarily be considered commerce ‘among’ foreign nations or 
‘purely foreign’ commerce.”).  
 26. 213 U.S. 347 (1909).  
 27. See id. at 354 (summarizing the plaintiff’s allegations). 
 28. See id. at 355 (explaining that “the acts causing the damage were 
done . . . outside the jurisdiction of the United States,” and finding it “entirely 
plain that what defendant did in Panama or Costa Rica is not within the scope 
of the [Sherman Act]”). 
 29. See id. at 356 (indicating that such overreaching “not only would be 
unjust, but would be an interference with the authority of another sovereign, 
contrary to the comity of nations, which the other state concerned justly might 
resent” (citation omitted)).  
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noting “the general and almost universal rule . . . that the 
character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be determined 
wholly by the law of the country where the act is done.”30 
Courts have since abandoned American Banana’s 
territoriality standard and replaced it with the “effects test.”31 In 
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa),32 Judge 
Learned Hand construed the Sherman Act to mean a “state may 
impose liabilities . . . for conduct outside its borders that has 
consequences within its borders which the state reprehends.”33 
He further concluded that American antitrust laws extend to 
foreign acts that are intended to affect U.S. commerce and 
actually have such an effect.34 Alcoa dictated that “the situs of 
the effects as opposed to the conduct” determined whether U.S. 
antitrust laws applied.35 Thus, anticompetitive activity that 
“restrain[s] the domestic or foreign commerce of the United 
States is not outside the reach of the Sherman Act just because 
part of the conduct complained of occurs in foreign countries.”36 
Following Alcoa, it became “abundantly plain that some 
extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act [was] proper.”37 
                                                                                                     
 30. Id. 
 31. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 494 F. Supp. 
1161, 1181 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (“American Banana has never been explicitly 
overruled. However, its authority has been so eroded by subsequent case law as 
to have been effectively limited to its specific factual pattern.”); Dominicus 
Americana Bohio v. Gulf & W. Indus., Inc., 473 F. Supp. 680, 687 (S.D.N.Y. 
1979) (stating that “history has proven American Banana to be not a seminal 
decision but an aberration”); AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 22, ¶ 272c, at 
278 (“Since at least 1945, the American Banana test has been rejected.”). 
 32. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). The Second Circuit sat as a court of last 
resort because the Supreme Court lacked a quorum. Id. at 421. Thus, the Alcoa 
decision carries the precedential weight of a Supreme Court opinion. 
 33. Id. at 443 (citations omitted). 
 34. See id. at 443–44 (articulating the appropriate standard for assessing 
whether U.S. antitrust law covers foreign conduct); see also H.R. REP. NO. 
97-686, at 5 (1982) (summarizing the Alcoa test); AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra 
note 22, ¶ 272d, at 179–80 (explaining the Alcoa decision). 
 35. H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, at 5 (1982) (citation omitted). 
 36. Cont’l Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 705 
(1962) (rejecting the American Banana test when conduct “had an impact within 
the United States and upon its foreign trade”).  
 37. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 494 F. Supp. 1161, 
1185 (E.D. Pa. 1980). 
496 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 489 (2016) 
The effects test, however, led to confusion among courts 
regarding the nature and extent of effects required.38 
B. The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982 
1. Statutory Language 
In 1982, Congress enacted the FTAIA to clarify the 
extraterritorial reach of U.S. antitrust law.39 The statute provides 
that the Sherman Act 
shall not apply to conduct involving trade or commerce (other 
than import trade or import commerce) with foreign nations 
unless— 
(1) such conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably 
foreseeable effect— 
(A) on trade or commerce which is not trade or commerce 
with foreign nations, or on import trade or import 
commerce with foreign nations; or  
(B) on export trade or export commerce with foreign 
nations, of a person engaged in such trade or commerce in 
the United States; and  
(2) such effect gives rise to a claim under the [Sherman Act].40 
This effectively means the antitrust laws do not apply to 
most foreign anticompetitive conduct.41 The FTAIA initially 
                                                                                                     
 38. Compare Todhunter-Mitchell & Co. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 383 F. 
Supp. 586, 587 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (looking to whether the conduct “directly affect[s] 
the flow of foreign commerce into or out of this country”), with United States v. 
R.P. Oldham Co., 152 F. Supp. 818, 822 (N.D. Cal. 1957) (requiring a “direct and 
substantial restraint” (emphasis added)), and United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 82 
F. Supp. 753, 891 (D.N.J. 1949) (asserting that foreign conduct “must have had 
a direct and substantial effect” (emphasis added)), with Indus. Inv. Dev. Corp. v. 
Mitsui & Co., 671 F.2d 876, 883 (5th Cir. 1982) (requiring conduct to “directly or 
substantially affect” U.S. commerce in order to come “within the scope of the 
Sherman Act” (emphasis added)), and Dominicus Americana Bohio v. Gulf & W. 
Indus., Inc., 473 F. Supp. 680, 687 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (“[I]t is probably not 
necessary for the effect on foreign commerce to be both substantial and direct as 
long as it is not [d]e minimis.”). 
 39. See H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, at 2 (indicating the statute’s purpose). 
 40. 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2012). 
 41. See F. Hoffman–La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 158 
(2004) (discussing the FTAIA’s text); AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 22, 
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excludes all export and other commercial activities occurring 
abroad from the Sherman Act’s scope.42 It then provides an 
exception bringing “such conduct back within the Sherman Act’s 
reach provided that the conduct both (1) sufficiently affects 
American commerce . . . and (2) has an effect of a kind that 
antitrust law considers harmful.”43 The FTAIA does not apply to 
import trade and import commerce because that activity is 
already subject to the Sherman Act.44 
2. Congressional Purpose 
Congress enacted the FTAIA in 1982 with two primary 
purposes: (1) to clarify the scope of the Sherman Act’s jurisdiction 
with respect to foreign transactions and (2) to boost American 
exports.45 Various courts had reached different conclusions 
regarding the precise nature and extent of the effect required 
under Alcoa.46 Congress intended the FTAIA’s objective “direct, 
substantial, and reasonably foreseeable” test to “serve as a simple 
and straightforward clarification of existing American law and 
the Department of Justice enforcement standards.”47 Thus, the 
Act was supposed to provide “a clear benchmark” for 
                                                                                                     
¶ 272i, at 288 (same). 
 42. See Empagran, 542 U.S. at 162 (interpreting the FTAIA’s technical 
language). 
 43. Id.  
 44. See 15 U.S.C. § 6a (covering conduct with foreign nations “other than 
import trade or import commerce”); H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, at 9 (“[I]t is important 
that there be no misunderstanding that import restraints, which can be 
damaging to American consumers, remain covered by the [Sherman Act].” 
(quoting Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law of 
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 99 (1981) (statement of James R. 
Atwood, Partner, Covington & Burling))); id. at 10 (clarifying that “import 
transactions are not” covered by the FTAIA amendment). 
 45. See H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, at 2 (clarifying the Sherman Act “to make 
explicit [its] application only to conduct having a ‘direct, substantial, and 
reasonably foreseeable effect’ on domestic commerce or domestic exports” and 
seeking “to promote American exports”).  
 46. See id. at 5 (discussing inconsistencies in courts’ application of the 
Alcoa test). 
 47. Id. at 2. 
498 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 489 (2016) 
businesspeople, the legal community, and America’s trading 
partners.48  
The FTAIA is primarily concerned with American consumers 
and exporters.49 The Act provides that the antitrust laws do not 
apply to wholly foreign transactions or export trade unless the 
requisite effect is felt within the United States.50 Accordingly, the 
Sherman Act does not reach conduct that causes purely foreign 
injury.51 In enacting the FTAIA, Congress aimed to “release 
domestic (and foreign) anticompetitive conduct from Sherman Act 
constraints when that conduct causes foreign harm.”52 This 
limitation reflects Congress’s fear that expansive extraterritorial 
reach of the U.S. antitrust laws would expose American courts to 
litigation “at the behest of foreign interests in cases having only 
minimal consequences for American economic interests.”53  
C. Early Interpretations of the FTAIA 
The FTAIA initially garnered little attention after its 
passage in 1982.54 About a decade later, courts began wrestling 
                                                                                                     
 48. Id. at 2–3. 
 49. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 22, ¶ 272i, at 287 (“[T]he concern 
of the antitrust laws is protection of American consumers and American 
exporters, not foreign consumers or producers.”); see also H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, 
at 2 (hoping the FTAIA would “encourage the business community to engage in 
efficiency producing joint conduct in the export of American goods and 
services”); 127 CONG. REC. H779 (daily ed. Mar. 4, 1981) (statement of Rep. 
Peter W. Rodino) (noting that the bill aims to allow “American firms greater 
freedom when dealing internationally while reinforcing the fundamental 
commitment of the United States to a Competitive domestic marketplace”). 
 50. See H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, at 10 (establishing that “wholly foreign 
transactions . . . are covered by the amendment” if they satisfy the effect 
requirement). 
 51. See F. Hoffman–La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 161 
(2004) (“The FTAIA seeks to make clear to American exporters (and to firms 
doing business abroad) that the Sherman Act does not prevent them from 
entering into business arrangements (say, joint-selling arrangements), however 
anticompetitive, as long as those arrangements adversely affect only foreign 
markets.”). 
 52. Id. at 166. 
 53. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 22, ¶ 272i, at 287. 
 54. See, e.g., United States v. LSL Biotechnologies, 379 F.3d 672, 678 (9th 
Cir. 2004) (“Federal courts did not shower the FTAIA with attention for the first 
decade after its enactment.”); Delrahim, supra note 3, at 419 (“For several years, 
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with the statute and interpreting its technical, inelegant 
language.55 In Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California,56 the 
Supreme Court resolved any lingering tension between American 
Banana and Alcoa, declaring: “[I]t is well established by now that 
the Sherman Act applies to foreign conduct that was meant to 
produce and did in fact produce some substantial effect in the 
United States.”57 
Courts have interpreted the antitrust laws, including the 
FTAIA, with an eye towards the principle of comity.58 As a 
general interpretive rule, ambiguous statutes are normally 
construed “to avoid unreasonable interference with the sovereign 
authority of other nations.”59 Courts must assume Congress 
judiciously considered other nations’ sovereign interests when 
drafting legislation.60 Because the underlying purpose of the 
antitrust laws is to protect American consumers and American 
commerce, “U.S. law should not supplant the policy choices that 
other countries have made” when the injury is felt outside of the 
United States.61 The Supreme Court has warned of the “serious 
                                                                                                     
courts seemed to avoid the FTAIA, and it attracted little attention well into the 
1990s.”). 
 55. See, e.g., LSL Biotechnologies, 379 F.3d at 698 (noting “the case 
reporters have steadily filled with decisions interpreting this previously obscure 
statute”); Empagran, 542 U.S. at 162 (characterizing the FTAIA’s language as 
“technical”); United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 109 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 
1997) (“The FTAIA is inelegantly phrased . . . .”). 
 56. 509 U.S. 764 (1993). 
 57. Id. at 796 (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 
U.S. 574, 582 n.6 (1986)). 
 58. See Delrahim, supra note 3, at 421 (emphasizing that courts should 
construe “U.S. antitrust laws, like other U.S. laws,” to avoid undue interference 
with the legitimate interests of foreign sovereigns); see also RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 403(1) (AM. LAW 
INST. 1987) (“[A] state may not exercise jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect 
to a person or activity having connections with another state when the exercise 
of such jurisdiction is unreasonable.”). 
 59. F. Hoffman–La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 164 (2004) 
(citations omitted). 
 60. See id. (discussing the assumption that legislators account for other 
sovereigns’ legitimate interests). 
 61. Delrahim, supra note 3, at 421 (explaining the importance of comity 
when enforcing U.S. antitrust laws); see also Pfizer, Inc. v. Gov’t of India, 434 
U.S. 308, 314 (1978) (“Congress’ foremost concern in passing the antitrust laws 
was the protection of Americans.”). 
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risk of interference with a foreign nation’s ability to 
independently regulate its own commercial affairs.”62 
Application of U.S. antitrust laws to foreign conduct, however, 
may still accord with the principle of comity as long as it 
“reflect[s] a legislative effort to redress domestic antitrust injury 
that foreign anticompetitive conduct has caused.”63 
While the FTAIA aimed to clarify the extraterritorial reach 
of U.S. antitrust law, the amendment actually left many 
questions unanswered.64 One interpretative issue is whether the 
FTAIA’s restrictions on the Sherman Act’s extraterritorial scope 
are jurisdictional or substantive in nature.65 A substantive 
statutory provision defines the elements essential for a 
meritorious claim, whereas subject matter jurisdiction relates to 
a court’s power to hear a case.66 The 
substantive-versus-jurisdictional distinction matters because it 
affects, for example, how courts handle disputed facts and 
dictates when a party may raise a claim.67 
Initially, courts treated the FTAIA’s limitations as 
jurisdictional constraints rather than substantive elements of a 
                                                                                                     
 62. Empagran, 542 U.S. at 165; see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. 
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 582 (1986) (“American antitrust laws do not 
regulate the competitive conditions of other nations’ economies.”). 
 63. Empagran, 542 U.S. at 165 (citations omitted). 
 64. See, e.g., Huffman, supra note 10, at 285 (“Far from bringing clarity to 
the law of extraterritorial antitrust enforcement, the FTAIA has introduced 
confusion into a regime that, before its enactment, was a modestly successful 
common-law scheme.”). 
 65. Compare United Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Angus Chem. Co., 322 F.3d 942, 
952 (7th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (deeming the FTAIA’s limitations to be 
jurisdictional), overruled by Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium Inc., 683 F.3d 845 (7th 
Cir. 2012) (en banc), with Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. China Minmetals Corp., 
654 F.3d 462, 469 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding that “the FTAIA imposes a substantive 
merits limitation rather than a jurisdictional bar”). 
 66. See Morrison v. Nat’l Austrl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 254 (2010) 
(explaining the difference between subject-matter jurisdiction and merits 
questions in the context of extraterritorial securities law); Animal Science, 654 
F.3d at 467 (discussing substantive and jurisdictional limitations with respect to 
the FTAIA). 
 67. See Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium Inc., 683 F.3d 845, 852–53 (7th Cir. 
2012) (en banc) (explaining the importance of the distinction). For example, the 
distinction controls whether a party uses a motion to dismiss for failure to state 
a claim, per Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), or a motion to dismiss for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, per Rule 12(b)(1). Id. 
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claim.68 This changed after Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp.,69 an 
employment discrimination case in which the Supreme Court 
announced a bright-line test to determine when statutory 
requirements are jurisdictional:  
If the Legislature clearly states that a threshold limitation on 
a statute’s scope shall count as jurisdictional, then courts and 
litigants will not be left to wrestle with the issue. But when 
Congress does not rank a statutory limitation on coverage as 
jurisdictional, courts should treat the restriction as 
nonjurisdictional in character.70 
Since Arbaugh, the federal courts of appeal have determined that 
the FTAIA’s requirements go to the merits of a Sherman Act 
claim rather than to the court’s subject matter jurisdiction.71  
Another major issue is whether the FTAIA codified existing 
common law standards—as applied in Alcoa and its progeny—or 
introduced a new dimension to antitrust law.72 This critical 
                                                                                                     
 68. See, e.g., United Phosphorus, 322 F.3d at 952 (characterizing FTAIA 
inquiries as jurisdictional because the “FTAIA limits the power of the United 
States courts (and private plaintiffs) from nosing about where they do not 
belong”); Filetech S.A. v. Fr. Telecom S.A., 157 F.3d 922, 931 (2d Cir. 1998) 
(describing the FTAIA’s limitations as jurisdictional). But see Hartford Fire Ins. 
Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 813 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he 
extraterritorial reach of the Sherman Act . . . has nothing to do with the 
jurisdiction of the courts. It is a question of substantive law turning on whether, 
in enacting the Sherman Act, Congress asserted regulatory power over the 
challenged conduct.”). Although the Hartford Fire majority “had no need to 
engage the dissenters on the ‘element’ versus ‘jurisdiction’ point,” Justice 
Scalia’s dissent still sheds light on the issue. United Phosphorus, 322 F.3d at 
956 (Wood, J., dissenting).  
 69. 546 U.S. 500 (2006). 
 70. Id. at 515–16 (analyzing whether a statutory limitation in Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 affects subject matter jurisdiction or constitutes a 
“substantive element of the claim on the merits”). 
 71. See Lotes Co. v. Hon Hai Precision Indus. Co., 753 F.3d 395, 405 (2d 
Cir. 2014) (“[T]he requirements of the FTAIA are substantive and 
nonjurisdictional in nature.”); Minn-Chem, 683 F.3d at 852 (adopting rule “that 
the FTAIA spells out an element of the claim”); Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. China 
Minmetals Corp., 654 F.3d 462, 469 (3d Cir. 2011) (overruling earlier precedent 
construing “the FTAIA as imposing a jurisdictional limitation on the application 
of the Sherman Act”). 
 72. See United States v. LSL Biotechnologies, 379 F.3d 672, 678 (9th Cir. 
2004) (noting that “many courts have debated whether the FTAIA established a 
new jurisdictional standard or merely codified the standard applied in Alcoa and 
its progeny”). 
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question ultimately informs the meaning of direct and thus the 
proper test for determining the Sherman Act’s extraterritorial 
reach.73 If the FTAIA merely codified existing law, then precedent 
must guide any judicial interpretation of the word direct.74 If the 
FTAIA articulated a new dimension of antitrust law, however, 
then courts interpret the meaning of direct from scratch because 
the pre-FTAIA common law does not guide their analysis.75 
In Hartford Fire, the Supreme Court raised this question—
without answering it—in the context of an alleged conspiracy 
among London reinsurance companies to manipulate the primary 
insurance market in the United States.76 The Court noted that it 
is “unclear . . . whether the [FTAIA’s] ‘direct, substantial, and 
reasonably foreseeable effect’ standard amends existing law or 
merely codifies it. We need not address [this] question[] here.”77 
The issue of whether Congress intended to substantively change 
the preexisting common law standards remains open to debate.78 
III. Diverging Tests for Direct Effect 
Following the FTAIA’s enactment, the legal community 
struggled to define the word direct.79 The Ninth Circuit was the 
first “to face the dragon in his teeth and stop tap dancing around 
                                                                                                     
 73. See infra notes 74–75 and accompanying text (explaining significance of 
codification debate). 
 74. See LSL Biotechnologies, 379 F.3d at 691 (Aldisert, J., dissenting) (“I 
am guided by contemporary definitions of the term as well as relevant 
precedent, including that which preexisted by the FTAIA.”). 
 75. Cf. id. at 679–80 (majority opinion) (interpreting the FTAIA anew 
without relying on existing common law standards). 
 76. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 770–78 (1993) 
(summarizing the case). 
 77. Id. at 796 n.23 (citation omitted). 
 78. See Delrahim, supra note 3, at 418 (“The common law standard for the 
reach of the Sherman Act to foreign conduct may or may not have changed with 
the enactment of the FTAIA . . . .”). 
 79. See Huffman, supra note 10, at 315 (“‘[D]irect, substantial, and 
reasonably foreseeable’ is not self-defining and has created interpretive 
difficulties.”); Sowell, supra note 2, at 514 (“[T]he FTAIA has merely added to 
the mounting confusion surrounding the application of American antitrust laws 
to foreign conduct.”). 
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the meaning of the word ‘direct.’”80 Since then, two other circuits 
have tackled the issue and reached a different conclusion.81  
A. Immediate Consequence Test 
The Ninth Circuit articulated the immediate consequence 
test in United States v. LSL Biotechnologies.82 In LSL 
Biotechnologies, the government brought an antitrust action 
challenging a noncompete agreement between LSL 
Biotechnologies (an American corporation) and Hazera (an Israeli 
corporation).83 These companies sought to develop a 
genetically-altered tomato seed that would produce ripe tomatoes 
with enough shelf life to travel from the growing locations to the 
various markets without spoiling.84 The agreement allocated to 
each party exclusive territories to sell long shelf-life seeds, and 
LSL Biotechnologies received North America in the deal.85 The 
government challenged the agreement as a “naked restraint of 
trade” because it “unreasonably reduc[ed] competition to develop 
better seeds for fresh-market, long shelf-life tomatoes for sale in 
the United States.”86  
A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district 
court’s dismissal of the government’s complaint because the 
noncompete agreement did not have a direct effect on U.S. 
commerce, as required by the FTAIA.87 The Ninth Circuit 
announced that a direct effect “follows as an immediate 
consequence” of the conduct at issue.88 The effect cannot depend 
                                                                                                     
 80. United States v. LSL Biotechnologies, 379 F.3d 672, 684 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(Aldisert, J., dissenting). 
 81. See infra Parts III.B.1–2 (presenting an alternative test adopted by the 
Second and Seventh Circuits). 
 82. 379 F.3d 672 (9th Cir. 2004).  
 83. Id. at 674. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 674–75. 
 86. Id. at 675. 
 87. See id. (“[T]he United States has not presented us with sufficient 
evidence to conclude that the district court clearly erred in ruling on the existing 
pleadings that Hazera’s exclusion does not yet have a direct effect on domestic 
commerce.”). 
 88. Id. at 680 (citing Republic of Arg. v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 618 
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on uncertain and intervening events.89 In reaching this 
conclusion, the majority cited a dictionary published 
contemporaneously with the FTAIA’s enactment, which defined 
direct as “proceeding from one point to another in time or space 
without deviation or interruption.”90  
The Ninth Circuit majority also relied on the Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of the term direct in the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act (FSIA).91 The FSIA states, in relevant part, that 
sovereign immunity of foreign nations does not extend to conduct 
“outside the territory of the United States . . . that . . . causes a 
direct effect in the United States.”92 In Republic of Argentina v. 
Weltover, Inc.,93 the Supreme Court interpreted this provision 
and determined that an effect is direct under the FSIA if it is an 
immediate consequence of the conduct.94 Weltover denied that the 
FSIA section at issue “contains any unexpressed requirement of 
‘substantiality’ or ‘foreseeability’” qualifying the requisite direct 
effect.95  
In interpreting the FTAIA’s legislative history, the LSL 
Biotechnologies court rejected the contention that “the FTAIA 
merely codified the existing common law regarding when the 
Sherman Act applies to foreign conduct.”96 The court refused to 
apply Alcoa’s effects test anymore.97 It believed Alcoa only 
required “some substantial effect in the United States.”98 Thus, 
                                                                                                     
(1992)). 
 89. See id. at 681 (“An effect cannot be ‘direct’ where it depends on such 
uncertain intervening developments.”). 
 90. Id. at 680 (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 
640 (1981)). 
 91. 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (2012).  
 92. Id. § 1605(a)(2) (emphasis added). 
 93. 504 U.S. 607 (1992). 
 94. See id. at 618 (defining “direct effect” under the FSIA). 
 95. Id. The Court’s statement is relevant because the FTAIA, unlike the 
FSIA, does contain express requirements of foreseeability and substantiality. 
See infra notes 125–130 and accompanying text (differentiating between the 
FSIA and FTAIA). 
 96. United States v. LSL Biotechnologies, 379 F.3d 672, 679 (9th Cir. 
2004). 
 97. See id. (concluding that the FTAIA’s promulgation precludes any 
reliance on Alcoa).  
 98. Id. at 679 (quoting Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 
796 (1993)). 
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the court viewed the directness requirement as a new ingredient 
the FTAIA added to existing extraterritorial standards.99 So it 
interpreted the word direct anew—that is, not considering prior 
antitrust common law interpretations—and formulated the 
immediate consequence test.100 
Judge Aldisert, a seasoned antitrust jurist, criticized the 
majority’s interpretation of direct in his dissenting opinion.101 He 
asserted that the FTAIA’s use of the word direct is “merely a 
codification of antitrust law in place prior to the enactment of the 
FTAIA.”102 He further contended the direct effects requirement 
has been an integral part of antitrust law before and after the 
FTAIA’s passage in 1982.103 To support this proposition, Judge 
Aldisert pointed to historical case law (dating back to 1898), the 
Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations of the United States 
(1965), the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) Antitrust Guide for 
International Operations (1977), and the American Bar 
Association (ABA) Section of Antitrust Law’s Report Concerning 
Legislative Proposals to Promote Export Trading (1981).104 
Next, Judge Aldisert rejected the majority’s characterization 
of the Alcoa decision.105 In Alcoa, Judge Learned Hand stated 
that “the ingot fabricated by ‘Alcoa,’ necessarily had a direct effect 
upon the ingot market.”106 Thus, the LSL Biotechnologies 
majority’s contention that Alcoa did not contemplate a directness 
                                                                                                     
 99. See id. (contending that Congress would not have said “direct, 
substantial, and reasonably foreseeable” if it meant to require only “some 
substantial effect”); id. at 680 n.6 (stating that the FTAIA, not the common law, 
provides the source of the directness requirement). 
 100. See id. at 680 (interpreting direct and failing to consult common law 
extraterritoriality standards to inform the analysis). 
 101. See id. at 692 (Aldisert, J., dissenting) (rejecting the majority’s 
interpretation of direct). 
 102. Id. at 683. 
 103. See id. at 685–87 (asserting that the “direct effects” test has long been 
“part and parcel of antitrust law”). 
 104. See id. at 685–91 (detailing the history of extraterritorial antitrust law 
from 1898 through the FTAIA’s passage in 1982). See also infra Part IV.A.3 for 
an in-depth discussion of pre-FTAIA extraterritorial standards. 
 105. See United States v. LSL Biotechnologies, 379 F.3d 672, 687 (9th Cir. 
2004) (Aldisert, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority’s analysis of Alcoa). 
 106. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1945) 
(emphasis added). 
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requirement actually “runs counter to the explicit teachings of 
Alcoa.”107  
Judge Aldisert also criticized the majority’s reliance on one 
particular definition of the word direct.108 Courts assume that 
Congress intends words to carry “their ordinary, contemporary, 
common meaning.”109 The definition used by the majority—
“proceeding from one point to another in time or space without 
deviation or interruption”110—is but one of seven main meanings 
in the same dictionary, many of which are ordinary and 
common.111 Thus, it is arbitrary to select one definition and 
“declare it the ‘plain meaning’ in the abstract.”112 Rather, 
deducing the meaning of direct requires consideration of the 
various contemporaneous definitions as informed by the statute’s 
history and context.113 
Alternatively, Judge Aldisert proposed a definition 
synonymous with proximate cause in light of the history of 
extraterritoriality and the overall purpose of antitrust law.114 
While Judge Aldisert could not convince the other Ninth Circuit 
panelists of this position, his definition gained traction eight 
years later when the issue came before the Seventh Circuit.115  
                                                                                                     
 107. LSL Biotechnologies, 379 F.3d at 687. Judge Aldisert noted that both 
Phillip E. Areeda and Herbert Hovenkamp, leading commentators on this issue, 
echoed his view of Alcoa: “As Judge Hand made clear in his Alcoa opinion, the 
Sherman Act would govern the world unless significant/direct/intended effects 
were required, for American commerce is affected in some degree by every force 
affecting the world’s markets in which we buy or sell.” Id. (quoting 4 PHILLIP E. 
AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 272, at 363 (2d ed. 2000)). 
 108. See id. at 692 (critiquing the majority’s interpretation). 
 109. Pioneer Inv. Serv. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. LP, 507 U.S. 380, 388 
(1993) (quoting Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979)). 
 110. WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 640 (1981). 
 111. See United States v. LSL Biotechnologies, 379 F.3d 672, 692 (9th Cir. 
2004) (Aldisert, J., dissenting) (discussing other definitions). 
 112. Id. 
 113. See id. (requiring consideration of the FTAIA’s context and history in 
defining direct). 
 114. See id. at 692–94 (arguing that the most appropriate definition is 
“characterized by or giving evidence of a close especially logical, causal, or 
consequential relationship” (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL 
DICTIONARY 640 (1981)). 
 115. See infra Part III.B.1 (describing the Seventh Circuit’s adoption of the 
reasonably proximate causal nexus standard).  
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B. Reasonably Proximate Causal Nexus Test 
The Seventh and Second Circuits have endorsed a competing 
approach, under which an effect is direct—for FTAIA purposes—
when there is a reasonably proximate causal nexus between the 
conduct and effect.116 The Antitrust Division of the Department of 
Justice and the Federal Trade Commission have also endorsed 
this test.117 
1. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
In Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium Inc.,118 American purchasers 
of potash119 accused foreign potash producers of participating in 
an international cartel that “restrained global output of potash in 
order to inflate prices.”120 The plaintiffs alleged that defendants 
conspired to fix prices in various foreign countries and used those 
inflated prices as benchmarks for sales in the United States.121 
The Seventh Circuit considered whether the defendants’ allegedly 
anticompetitive conduct had the requisite direct, substantial, and 
reasonably foreseeable effect on U.S. commerce.122  
The Seventh Circuit ultimately affirmed the district court’s 
denial of defendants’ motion to dismiss.123 In doing so, the court 
interpreted the FTAIA’s domestic-injury exception and 
                                                                                                     
 116. See Lotes Co. v. Hon Hai Precision Indus. Co., 753 F.3d 395, 398 (2d 
Cir. 2014) (articulating the reasonably proximate causal nexus test); 
Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium Inc., 683 F.3d 845, 856–57 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc) 
(same). 
 117. See Brief for the United States and the Federal Trade Commission as 
Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 13–14, Motorola Mobility LLC v. 
AU Optronics Corp., 775 F.3d 816 (7th Cir. 2015) (No. 14-8003) [hereinafter 
DOJ & FTC Motorola Brief] (arguing in favor of the proximate cause standard). 
 118. 683 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc). 
 119. Potash is “a naturally occurring mineral used in agricultural fertilizers 
and other products.” Id. at 848. 
 120. Id. at 849. 
 121. Id. 
 122. See id. at 859 (analyzing whether the defendants’ conduct satisfied the 
FTAIA’s requirements). 
 123. See id. (“It is no stretch to say that the foreign supply restrictions, and 
the concomitant price increases forced upon the Chinese purchasers, were a 
direct—that is, proximate—cause of the subsequent price increases in the 
United States.”). 
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determined that directness is synonymous with proximate 
cause.124 Judge Wood, writing for the majority, reasoned that the 
nexus test is more consistent with the statutory language than 
the immediate consequence test.125 The court criticized the Ninth 
Circuit for using the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the FSIA 
to interpret the FTAIA.126 The two statutes have distinct textual 
differences: the FSIA requires only a “direct” effect, while the 
FTAIA requires a “direct, substantial, and reasonably 
foreseeable” effect.127 Furthermore, the Supreme Court in 
Weltover announced that the FSIA does not contain an 
unexpressed requirement of foreseeability or substantiality.128 
The FTAIA, on the other hand, explicitly includes the words 
“substantial” and “foreseeable.”129 Thus, Congress signaled that 
the words direct, substantial, and foreseeable are to be 
interpreted as an integrated phrase.130 The Seventh Circuit 
explained that adding the concept of immediacy or certainty on 
top of the “direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable” 
requirements “results in a stricter test than the complete text of 
the statute can bear.”131  
The reasonably proximate causal nexus test properly 
excludes “foreign activities that are too remote from the ultimate 
effects on U.S. domestic or import commerce.”132 Judge Wood 
noted that this approach addresses the classic concern about 
                                                                                                     
 124. See id. at 856–57 (considering “what it takes to show ‘direct’ effects” 
and announcing that “the term ‘direct’ means only ‘a reasonably proximate 
causal nexus’”). 
 125. See id. (“We are persuaded that the [reasonably proximate causal 
nexus] approach is more consistent with the language of the statute.”). 
 126. See id. (“In our view, the Ninth Circuit jumped too quickly to the 
assumption that the FSIA and the FTAIA use the word ‘direct’ in the same 
way.”). 
 127. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (2012) (FSIA), with 15 U.S.C. § 6a 
(2012) (FTAIA). 
 128. See Republic of Arg. v. Weltover, Inc. 504 U.S. 607, 618 (1992) 
(analyzing the use of direct in the FSIA). 
 129. See Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium Inc., 845 F.3d 845, 857 (7th Cir. 2012) 
(en banc) (explaining that there is no need to read “substantial” and 
“foreseeable” into the statute). 
 130. See id. (reading direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable as an 
integrated phrase). 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
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remoteness—that courts “should not impute to Congress an 
intent to punish all whom its courts can catch, for conduct which 
has no consequences within the United States.”133 Just as tort 
law cuts off recovery for injuries too remote from the cause of an 
injury, the FTAIA excludes from the Sherman Act’s scope foreign 
activities “too remote from the ultimate effects on U.S. domestic 
or import commerce.”134 
2. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
The Second Circuit also adopted the reasonably proximate 
causal nexus test in Lotes Co. v. Hon Hai Precision Industry 
Co.135 The plaintiff in Lotes was a Taiwanese corporation that 
designs and manufactures universal serial bus (USB) connectors 
that are incorporated into electronics manufactured abroad and 
later sold in the United States.136 By endorsing the reasonably 
proximate causal nexus approach, the court widened the split as 
to what constitutes a direct effect under the FTAIA.137 Judge 
Katzmann, writing for the majority, criticized the Ninth Circuit’s 
reliance on a single definition of direct in the dictionary,138 when 
“the same dictionary also defines ‘direct’ as ‘characterized by or 
giving evidence of a close especially logical, causal, or 
consequential relationship.’”139 Given the various alternative 
definitions offered in that particular dictionary, relying solely on 
the first definition listed was arbitrary and insufficient.140 
                                                                                                     
 133. Id. (quoting United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 443 
(2d Cir. 1945)). 
 134. Id. 
 135. See Lotes Co. v. Hon Hai Precision Indus. Co., 753 F.3d 395, 398 (2d 
Cir. 2014) (requiring “a reasonably proximate causal nexus between the conduct 
and the effect” to satisfy the FTAIA’s directness component). 
 136. Id. at 399–400. 
 137. Compare Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium Inc., 683 F.3d 845, 857 (7th Cir. 
2012) (en banc) (adopting the reasonably proximate causal nexus test), with 
United States v. LSL Biotechnologies, 379 F.3d 672, 680 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(adopting the immediate consequence test). 
 138. See Lotes, 753 F.3d at 410 (discussing the definition cited in LSL 
Biotechnologies). 
 139. Id. (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 640 
(1981)). 
 140. See id. (“[T]he relative order of the common dictionary definitions of a 
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The Second Circuit also found the Ninth Circuit’s reliance on 
the interpretation of a “nearly identical term” in the FSIA to be 
inappropriate.141 Judge Katzmann reiterated the Supreme 
Court’s warning that courts “must be careful not to apply rules 
applicable under one statute to a different statute without careful 
and critical examination.”142 The FSIA differs from the FTAIA in 
critical respects and therefore cannot be relied upon in 
interpreting the ambiguous language of the FTAIA.143  
The Second Circuit determined that LSL Biotechnologies’ 
interpretation of the word direct violates the “‘cardinal principle 
of statutory construction’ that statutes must be construed, if 
reasonably possible, so that ‘no clause, sentence, or word shall be 
superfluous, void, or insignificant.’”144 If direct is read to mean 
immediate, the separate “reasonably foreseeable” requirement 
“would be rob[bed] . . . of any meaningful function, since we are 
hard pressed to imagine any domestic effect that would be both 
‘immediate’ and ‘substantial’ but not ‘reasonably foreseeable.’”145  
While the court ultimately decided the case based on the 
FTAIA’s second prong,146 the Second Circuit nonetheless 
announced its adoption of the reasonably proximate causal nexus 
test to satisfy the FTAIA’s directness requirement.147 
                                                                                                     
single term does little to clarify that term’s meaning with a particular context. 
When a word has multiple definitions, usage determines its meaning.” (quoting 
Chi. Truck Drivers v. Leaseway Transp. Corp., 76 F.3d 824, 828 n.4 (7th Cir. 
1996))). 
 141. See id. (noting that “[m]ost words have different shades of meaning and 
consequently may be variously construed, not only when they occur in different 
statutes, but when used more than once in the same statute or even the same 
section” (quoting Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561, 574 (2007))).  
 142. Id. (quoting Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 174 (2009)). 
 143. See id. at 410–11 (analyzing the differences between the FSIA and 
FTAIA). See also infra Part IV.A.2 for further discussion about using the FSIA 
to interpret the FTAIA. 
 144. Lotes Co. v. Hon Hai Precision Indus. Co., 753 F.3d 395, 411 (2d Cir. 
2014) (quoting TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001)). 
 145. Id. 
 146. See 15 U.S.C. § 6(a)(2) (2012) (requiring the effect “give rise to” an 
antitrust cause of action). 
 147. See Lotes, 753 F.3d at 398 (determining that the direct requirement is 
satisfied “even if the effect does not follow as an immediate consequence of the 
defendant’s conduct, so long as there is a reasonably proximate causal nexus 
between the conduct and the effect”).  
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3. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission 
The Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice (DOJ) 
and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)—the governmental 
entities charged with enforcing the federal antitrust laws—
endorse the reasonably proximate causal nexus test.148 The DOJ, 
in its LSL Biotechnologies brief, urged that the most pertinent 
definition of direct for FTAIA purposes is “characterized by or 
giving evidence of a close especially logical, causal, or 
consequential relationship.”149 The DOJ highlighted that courts 
also utilize the concepts of directness and proximate causation 
when confronting antitrust standing inquiries in private 
plaintiffs’ suits.150 When determining which injuries the antitrust 
laws may properly redress, courts look at the directness of the 
injury sustained to determine whether it is too remote from the 
antitrust violation to warrant relief.151 In the standing context, 
courts equate remoteness and directness with the concept of 
proximate cause.152 The DOJ and FTC maintain that courts 
should similarly employ proximate causation to the FTAIA 
directness inquiry.153 
The DOJ and FTC assert that “[p]roximate causation is a 
‘flexible concept that generally refers to the basic requirement 
that . . . there must be some direct relation between the injury 
asserted and the injurious conduct alleged.’”154 This standard 
filters out “causal connections ‘so attenuated that the 
                                                                                                     
 148. See DOJ & FTC Motorola Brief, supra note 117, at 1, 13–14 (arguing in 
favor of the proximate cause standard); Delrahim, supra note 3, at 430 (“[T]he 
correct interpretation of ‘direct’ in the FTAIA is a reasonably proximate causal 
nexus.”). Makan Delrahim is the former Deputy Assistant Attorney General of 
the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division. Id. at 415. 
 149. Brief for Appellant United States of America at 36, United States v. 
LSL Biotechnologies, Inc., 379 F.3d 672 (9th Cir. 2004) (No. 02-16472) 
[hereinafter DOJ LSL Biotechnologies Brief]. 
 150. Id.  
 151. See id. at 36–37 (citing Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 
477 n.12 (1982)) (describing antitrust standing inquiries). 
 152. See id. at 37 (citing Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 477 
nn.12–13 (1982)) (analogizing proximate cause to remoteness and directness). 
 153. See DOJ & FTC Motorola Brief, supra note 117, at 14 (comparing the 
FTAIA directness issue to the remoteness issue in antitrust standing analyses). 
 154. Id. at 13 (quoting Paroline v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1710, 1719 
(2014)). 
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consequence is more aptly described as mere fortuity.’”155 The 
DOJ and FTC maintain that proximate causation is the 
appropriate test for determining when the Sherman Act may 
reach foreign anticompetitive conduct.156 
IV. Evaluation of the Direct Effect Tests 
A. Immediate Consequence Test 
As articulated by the Seventh Circuit, Second Circuit, and 
Judge Aldisert in his LSL Biotechnologies dissent, the immediate 
consequence test has three significant flaws: (1) it is based on an 
improper definition of direct; (2) it inappropriately relies on the 
FSIA to interpret the FTAIA; and (3) it misinterprets the 
FTAIA’s legislative history and the preexisting common law 
standard.157 
1. Definition of Direct 
When interpreting ambiguous statutory language, courts 
assume that Congress intends words to carry “their ordinary, 
contemporary, common meaning.”158 In analyzing the word direct 
as employed by the FTAIA, the Ninth Circuit in LSL 
Biotechnologies selected one definition, without explanation, and 
treated it as the plain meaning.159 The definition employed by the 
majority—“proceeding from one point to another in time or 
space without deviation or interruption”—is only one of many 
ordinary and common meanings of the term direct.160 The same 
                                                                                                     
 155. Id. at 14 (quoting Paroline v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1710, 1719 
(2014)). 
 156. Id. at 13–14; see also Delrahim, supra note 3, at 430 (“In the Division’s 
view, the correct interpretation of ‘direct’ in the FTAIA is a reasonably 
proximate causal nexus.”). 
 157. See infra Parts IV.A.1–3 (evaluating the immediate consequence test). 
 158. Pioneer Inv. Serv. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380, 
388 (1993) (quoting Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979)). 
 159. See United States v. LSL Biotechnologies, 379 F.3d 672, 679–80 (9th 
Cir. 2004) (looking to a contemporaneous definition in considering “what 
Congress meant by ‘direct’”). 
 160. See id. (discussing other definitions). 
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dictionary also contains six additional main meanings of direct, 
which are similarly contemporaneous with the FTAIA.161 Usage 
of a word in context should determine its meaning when it has 
multiple alternative definitions.162 The majority failed to 
adequately articulate why its particular definition is appropriate 
in light of the FTAIA’s context and history.163  
Because a definition centered on geography and time forms 
the basis of the immediate consequence test, the standard too 
narrowly focuses on the spatial and temporal separation between 
the conduct and effect.164 This fails to adequately consider the 
complex nature of the global economy and that “anticompetitive 
injuries can be transmitted through multi-layered supply 
chains.”165 A lapse of time between when the anticompetitive 
conduct occurred and when the effect is felt does not necessarily 
mitigate the harm. Perpetrators could easily design schemes to 
avoid antitrust injury by ensuring that the conduct and harmful 
effect do not occur sequentially.166  
2. Use of Direct in Other Statutes 
Another rule of statutory construction cautions courts not to 
“apply rules applicable under one statute to a different statute 
                                                                                                     
 161. Id. (citing WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 640 
(1981)). 
 162. See Chi. Truck Drivers v. Leaseway Transp. Corp., 76 F.3d 824, 828 n.4 
(7th Cir. 1996) (“[T]he relative order of the common dictionary definitions of a 
single term does little to clarify that term’s meaning within a particular context. 
When a word has multiple definitions, usage determines its meaning.”). 
 163. See LSL Biotechnologies, 379 F.3d at 680 (dedicating only one 
paragraph to considering dictionary definitions); see also id. at 692 (Aldisert, J., 
dissenting) (“It would be arbitrary simply to pick one definition and declare it 
the ‘plain meaning’ in the abstract. Determining the meaning of ‘direct’ requires 
the consideration of definitions as informed by the FTAIA’s context and 
history.”).  
 164. See Lotes Co. v. Hon Hai Precision Indus. Co., 753 F.3d 395, 412 (2d 
Cir. 2014) (critiquing the immediate consequence test). 
 165. Id. 
 166. See id. at 413 (“Indeed, given the important role that American firms 
and consumers play in the global economy, we expect that some perpetrators 
will design foreign anticompetitive schemes for the very purpose of causing 
harmful downstream effects in the United States.”). 
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without careful and critical examination.”167 Words frequently 
“have different shades of meaning, and consequently may be 
variously construed . . . when they occur in different statutes.”168 
The Ninth Circuit in LSL Biotechnologies presented a very 
cursory analysis of the FSIA’s use of the term direct and failed to 
explain the justification for relying on the FSIA in interpreting 
the FTAIA.169 Without careful and critical examination, the 
FSIA’s use of direct provides an insufficient basis for interpreting 
the FTAIA in the same way.170  
The two statutes differ in critical respects.171 The FSIA’s 
overarching purpose is to grant foreign nations sovereign 
immunity172 and to serve as “the sole basis for obtaining 
jurisdiction over a foreign state in” American courts.173 The 
FTAIA, on the other hand, is a substantive antitrust statute that 
clarifies “the Sherman Act’s scope as applied to foreign 
commerce.”174 
Furthermore, the statutes have significant textual 
differences.175 The FSIA does not extend sovereign immunity to 
                                                                                                     
 167. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 174 (2009) (quoting Fed. 
Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 393 (2008)). 
 168. Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561, 574 (2007) (quoting Atl. 
Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 433 (1932)). 
 169. See United States v. LSL Biotechnologies, 379 F.3d 672, 680 (9th Cir. 
2004) (interpreting the meaning of direct in just two paragraphs).   
 170. See Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium Inc., 683 F.3d 845, 857 (7th Cir. 2012) 
(en banc) (“[T]he Ninth Circuit jumped too quickly to the assumption that the 
FSIA and the FTAIA use the word ‘direct’ in the same way.”). 
 171. See Lotes Co. v. Hon Hai Precision Indus. Co., 753 F.3d 395, 410–11 (2d 
Cir. 2014) (comparing the FSIA and the FTAIA). 
 172. See 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (2012) (establishing that “a foreign state shall be 
immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of the 
States except as provided” by certain statutory exceptions). 
 173. Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 443 
(1989) (emphasis added).  
 174. F. Hoffman–La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 169 (2004) 
(citing H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, at 2–3 (1982)). At the time the Ninth Circuit 
decided LSL Biotechnologies, the courts still considered the FTAIA a 
jurisdictional rather than substantive statute. See, e.g., LSL Biotechnologies, 
379 F.3d at 679 (“Our precedent supports the conclusion that the FTAIA 
provides the guiding standard for jurisdiction over foreign restraints of trade.”). 
However, courts now treat the FTAIA as delineating a substantive element of 
an antitrust claim. Supra notes 65–71 and accompanying text. 
 175. See infra notes 176–180 and accompanying text (analyzing the textual 
differences between the FSIA and the FTAIA). 
IN NEED OF DIRECTION 515 
extraterritorial conduct that has a “direct effect” in the United 
States.176 The FTAIA, by contrast, contains the more extensive 
phrase “direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect.”177 
The Supreme Court in Weltover explicitly stated that the FSIA 
lacks “any unexpressed requirement of ‘substantiality’ or 
‘foreseeability.’”178 This means that a direct effect provides the 
baseline of the FSIA’s extraterritorial jurisdiction.179 The FTAIA, 
however, requires more—it demands an effect that is not only 
direct, but also substantial and reasonably foreseeable.180  
In creating the immediate consequence test, the Ninth 
Circuit erroneously relied on the FSIA to interpret the FTAIA 
without careful and critical consideration of the important 
differences between the two statutes.181 
3. The FTAIA’s Legislative History and Existing Common Law 
Standards 
The Ninth Circuit in LSL Biotechnologies misinterpreted the 
pre-FTAIA legal landscape when it determined that the FTAIA 
added an additional requirement to the existing common law 
standard for extraterritoriality.182 The majority believed that, 
“[un]like the FTAIA, the Alcoa test d[id] not require the effect to 
be ‘direct’” and only mandated “‘some substantial effect in the 
                                                                                                     
 176. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (declining to extend sovereign immunity to 
“an act outside the territory of the United States in connection with a 
commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct 
effect in the United States”). In other words, the FSIA provides jurisdiction over 
a foreign state for certain foreign conduct that has a “direct effect on the United 
States.” Id. 
 177. 15 U.S.C. § 6a(1) (2012). 
 178. Republic of Arg. v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 618 (1992). 
 179. See id. at 617–18 (rejecting the contention that under the FSIA “an 
effect is not ‘direct’ unless it is both ‘substantial’ and ‘foreseeable’”). 
 180. See United States v. LSL Biotechnologies, 379 F.3d 672, 692 n.5 (9th 
Cir. 2004) (Aldisert, J., dissenting) (comparing the sine qua non of the FSIA and 
FTAIA provisions at issue). 
 181. See supra notes 167–180 and accompanying text (contending that the 
FSIA should not serve as the basis for interpreting the word direct in the 
FTAIA). 
 182. See LSL Biotechnologies, 379 F.3d at 679 (rejecting the contention that 
“the FTAIA merely codified the existing common law regarding when the 
Sherman Act applies to foreign conduct”). 
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United States.’”183 However, Alcoa did in fact contemplate a 
directness requirement.184 In analyzing the effect of Alcoa’s 
anticompetitive behavior in manufacturing aluminum ingot, 
Judge Hand discussed how “the ingot fabricated by ‘Alcoa,’ 
necessarily had a direct effect upon the ingot market.”185 The 
Alcoa decision emphasized the need for “significant and direct 
effects” on U.S. commerce.186 The LSL Biotechnologies majority 
erred in concluding the FTAIA added a brand new component 
previously unknown to traditional extraterritorial antitrust 
law.187  
The more appropriate reading is that Congress intended to 
codify, rather than add a new dimension to, the existing common 
law effects test.188 “Directness” was integral to extraterritorial 
antitrust law when Congress enacted the FTAIA.189 All of the 
requirements in the FTAIA—directness, substantiality, and 
foreseeability—were present in the earlier case law.190 The 
Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United 
States, in effect at the time of the FTAIA’s promulgation in 1982, 
                                                                                                     
 183. Id. (quoting Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 796 
(1993)); see also id. (“[A]pplying the Alcoa test would render meaningless the 
word ‘direct’ in the FTAIA.”).  
 184. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 22, ¶ 272i, at 292–93 (“As Judge 
Hand made clear in his Alcoa opinion, the Sherman Act would govern the world 
unless significant/direct/intended effects were required, for American commerce 
is affected in some degree by every force affecting the world’s markets in which 
we buy and sell.”). 
 185. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 
1945). 
 186. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 22, ¶ 272i, at 292–93. 
 187. See infra notes 188–216 and accompanying text (arguing that the 
FTAIA codified existing law). 
 188. See United States v. LSL Biotechnologies, 379 F.3d 672, 685–91 (9th 
Cir. 2004) (Aldisert, J., dissenting) (tracing the history of the effects test and 
highlighting Congress’s codification of this existing standard); see also AREEDA & 
HOVENKAMP, supra note 22, ¶ 272i, at 292 (suggesting that codification of prior 
law is the better reading of the FTAIA). 
 189. See infra notes 190–198 and accompanying text (detailing prevalence of 
a directness requirement). 
 190. See, e.g., Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 
1297 (3d Cir. 1979) (considering the “[e]xistence of intent to harm or affect 
American commerce and its foreseeability”); United States v. R.P. Oldham Co., 
152 F. Supp. 818, 822 (N.D. Cal. 1957) (requiring a “direct and substantial 
restraint”); United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 82 F. Supp. 753, 891 (D.N.J. 1949) 
(asserting that foreign conduct “must have had a direct and substantial effect”). 
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included directness, substantiality, and foreseeability as 
prerequisites to extraterritorial application of domestic law.191  
After Alcoa and its subsequent judicial interpretations, the 
DOJ announced its view on the application of antitrust laws to 
foreign conduct in its Antitrust Guide to International 
Operations, released in 1977.192 Congress summarized the DOJ’s 
stance in the FTAIA’s House Report:  
United States antitrust laws should be applicable to an 
international transaction “when there is a substantial and 
foreseeable effect on the United States commerce,” and that it 
would be a miscarriage of Congressional intent to apply the 
Sherman Act to “foreign activities which have no direct or 
intended effect on United States consumers or export 
opportunities . . . .”193 
Thus, in 1977—five years prior to the FTAIA’s enactment—the 
DOJ understood that extraterritorial application of the antitrust 
laws required foreign transactions to have a substantial, 
foreseeable, and direct effect on the United States.194  
In October 1981, the ABA Section of Antitrust Law 
submitted a report to Congress regarding the proposed legislation 
on extraterritorial antitrust law.195 The report examined existing 
case law applying the effects test articulated in Alcoa.196 Even 
                                                                                                     
 191. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 18 (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (providing that a state’s laws may reach 
“conduct that occurs outside its territory and causes an effect within its territory 
if . . . the effect within the territory is substantial” and “it occurs as a direct and 
foreseeable result of the conduct outside the territory” (emphasis added)). 
 192. See ANTITRUST DIVISION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., ANTITRUST GUIDE TO INT’L 
OPERATIONS 6–7 (1977) [hereinafter DOJ ANTITRUST GUIDE] (remarking that 
“[t]he application of U.S. antitrust law to overseas activities raises some difficult 
questions”). 
 193. H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, at 5 (1982) (emphasis added) (citing DOJ 
ANTITRUST GUIDE, supra note 192, at 6–7). 
 194. See DOJ ANTITRUST GUIDE, supra note 192, at 9 (presenting DOJ’s 
interpretation of the Sherman Act’s extraterritorial scope). 
 195. See Am. Bar Ass’n, Section of Antitrust Law, Report to Accompany 
Resolutions Concerning Legislative Proposals to Promote Export Trading 10 
(1981) [hereinafter ABA Antitrust Section Report] (commenting on legislative 
proposals affecting extraterritorial reach of U.S. antitrust law), reprinted in The 
Commission on the International Application of the U.S. Antitrust Laws Act: 
Hearing on S. 432 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 216–51 
(1981). 
 196. See id. at 10–21 (analyzing cases using Alcoa’s effects test). 
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though the various formulations of the test were not linguistically 
identical to the standard propounded by the DOJ in its 
guidelines, “in substance, the tests were, for the most part, 
applied quite similarly.”197 The ABA report determined that, 
despite the variations in wording, “there [was], with rare 
exception, no significant inconsistency between judicial 
precedents and the Justice Department’s view of the effects 
test.”198  
While the FTAIA’s legislative history does not explicitly 
answer whether or not the FTAIA codified the common law 
extraterritorial standards, it still remains informative on the 
question.199 The House Report indicated that the FTAIA was to 
“serve as a simple and straightforward clarification of existing 
American law and the Department of Justice enforcement 
standards.”200 In the wake of Alcoa, “courts ha[d] arrived at 
different formulations of the nature and quantum of ‘effects’ 
needed” to permit application of the Sherman Act to foreign 
conduct.201 The Report discussed the existing case law and 
whether the differing articulations of the effects test led to 
                                                                                                     
 197. Id. at 10. 
 198. Id. 
 199. See Delrahim, supra note 3, at 418 (commenting that the common law 
standard “may or may not have changed with the enactment of the FTAIA in 
1982; the legislative history does not answer this question”); see also Ryan A. 
Haas, Act Locally, Apply Globally: Protecting Consumers from International 
Cartels by Applying Domestic Antitrust Law Globally, 15 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 
99, 106 (2003) (describing how the FTAIA’s legislative history is open to various 
interpretations). 
 200. H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, at 2 (1982). 
 201. Id. at 5 (citing cases applying the effects test in the wake of Alcoa). 
Compare, e.g., Todhunter-Mitchell & Co. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 383 F. Supp. 
586, 587 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (looking to whether the conduct “directly affect[s] the 
flow of foreign commerce into or out of this country”), with United States v. R.P. 
Oldham Co., 152 F. Supp. 818, 822 (N.D. Cal. 1957) (necessitating a “direct and 
substantial restraint” (emphasis added)), and United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 82 
F. Supp. 753, 891 (D.N.J. 1949) (asserting that foreign conduct “must have had 
a direct and substantial effect” (emphasis added)), with Indus. Inv. Dev. Corp. v. 
Mitsui & Co., 671 F.2d 876, 883 (5th Cir. 1982) (requiring conduct to “directly or 
substantially affect[]” U.S. commerce in order to come “within the scope of the 
Sherman Act” (emphasis added)), and Dominicus Americana Bohio v. Gulf & W. 
Indus., Inc., 473 F. Supp. 680, 687 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (“[I]t is probably not 
necessary for the effect on foreign commerce to be both substantial and direct as 
long as it is not [d]e minimis.”). 
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consistent or divergent results.202 It did not decide the question, 
however.203  
Regardless of whether or not the various judicial 
formulations produced inconsistent outcomes, the bill sought to 
prescribe a “single, clear standard” that would “provide 
assurances against private plaintiff’s [sic] successfully proposing 
different standards than those employed by the Department of 
Justice.”204 This would “allow consistent precedent to develop by 
providing more definite touchstones to guide the parties and the 
courts.”205  
Well-established principles of statutory construction counsel 
against reading the FTAIA as substantively changing the 
preexisting extraterritoriality standards.206 Courts must read 
“statutes which invade the common law . . . with a presumption 
favoring the retention of long-established and familiar principles, 
except when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident.”207 
Similarly, when a statute amends a preexisting statute, courts 
likewise “do not presume that the revision worked a change in 
the underlying substantive law unless an intent to make such a 
change is clear.”208  
The FTAIA does not show a clear intention to abandon the 
longstanding common law because the Supreme Court announced 
that the FTAIA is “unclear” as to whether it amends existing 
                                                                                                     
 202. Compare H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, at 5–6 (summarizing the viewpoint that 
there is “no significant inconsistency between judicial precedents and the 
Justice Department’s view of the effects test” (quoting ABA Antitrust Section 
Report, supra note 195, at 10)), with id. at 6 (“Judicial decisions are rife with 
inconsistencies regarding the types of effects on the domestic economy that must 
be demonstrated in order to establish U.S. antitrust jurisdiction over an 
international transaction.” (quoting Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act, 
Hearings on H.R. 2326 Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial 
Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 108 (1981) (statement of 
Martin F. Connor, Business Roundtable))). 
 203. See id. at 6 (“The Committee need not choose between these competing 
views to conclude that legislative clarification is appropriate.”). 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. 
 206. See infra notes 207–210 and accompanying text (discussing a new 
statute’s effect on existing law). 
 207. United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993) (quoting Isbrandtsen 
Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952)). 
 208. Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 209 (1993). 
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law.209 The legislative history, moreover, does not clearly express 
an intention to make significant changes to prior interpretations 
of the Sherman Act’s extraterritorial reach.210 Congress intended 
the FTAIA to be a “clarification of existing American law.”211 
Because the statute does not explicitly indicate a contrary 
intention, the FTAIA should not be read as altering the settled 
extraterritorial standards that predated its enactment.212 
The promulgation of the “direct, substantial, and reasonably 
foreseeable” standard in the FTAIA likely codified the direct 
effects requirement set forth in the teachings of Alcoa and its 
progeny, the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law, and the 
DOJ’s Antitrust Guide to International Operations.213 Even if it 
did not codify, Congress certainly did not intend the FTAIA to 
erase decades of common law.214 The LSL Biotechnologies court 
erred in interpreting the word from scratch.215 Relevant 
precedent, including that which preexisted the FTAIA, should 
have informed the Ninth Circuit’s analysis of the term direct 
when it formulated the immediate consequence test.216 
B. Reasonably Proximate Causal Nexus Test 
The reasonably proximate causal nexus test is the more 
appropriate standard because it (1) employs a fitting definition of 
                                                                                                     
 209. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 797 n.23 (1993) 
(declaring it “unclear . . . whether the [FTAIA’s] ‘direct, substantial, and 
reasonably foreseeable effect’ standard amends existing law or merely codifies 
it”). The Supreme Court declined to decide the issue, however. See id. (“We need 
not address th[is] question[] here.”). 
 210. See Delrahim, supra note 3, at 418 (commenting that the common law 
standard “may or may not have changed with the enactment of the FTAIA in 
1982; the legislative history does not answer this question”). 
 211. H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, at 2 (2012) (emphasis added). 
 212. Supra notes 206–210 and accompanying text. 
 213. Supra notes 182–205 and accompanying text. 
 214. Supra notes 206–212 and accompanying text. 
 215. See United States v. LSL Biotechnologies, 379 F.3d 672, 691 (9th Cir. 
2004) (Aldisert, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority’s decision to interpret the 
word direct anew). 
 216. Supra notes 182–212 and accompanying text. 
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the word direct; (2) corresponds with the statute’s plain language; 
and (3) comports with the purposes of the FTAIA.217 
1. Definition of Direct 
Given that the FTAIA codified existing common law 
extraterritoriality standards,218 relevant precedent predating the 
Act informs any interpretation of the word direct.219 There are 
numerous contemporaneous definitions of direct that are both 
ordinary and common.220 One such definition is “characterized by 
or giving evidence of a close especially logical, causal, or 
consequential relationship.”221 Because statutory interpretation 
is a “holistic endeavor,” the inquiry does not end at finding an 
ordinary meaning.222 In accordance with the fundamental 
principle of statutory construction, the “meaning of a word cannot 
be determined in isolation, but must be drawn from the context in 
which it is used.”223 Here, the FTAIA’s context and history must 
inform any construction of the meaning of direct.224 The most 
pertinent definition of direct is one that focuses on logical 
                                                                                                     
 217. See infra Parts IV.B.1–4 (evaluating the reasonably causal nexus test). 
 218. See supra Part IV.A.3 (arguing that the FTAIA codified prior common 
law). 
 219. See United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993) (“[S]tatutes which 
invade the common law . . . are to be read with a presumption favoring the 
retention of long-established and familiar principles . . . .” (quoting Isbrandtsen 
Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952))); Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 
U.S. 200, 209 (1993) (noting that when interpreting a statute amending a 
preexisting statute, courts “do not presume that the revision worked a change in 
the underlying substantive law unless an intent to make such a change is 
clearly expressed”). 
 220. See e.g., 4 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 702 (2d ed. 1989) (defining 
direct as, inter alia, “[s]traight; undeviating in course; not circuitous or crooked” 
and “[p]roceeding from antecedent to consequent, from cause to effect, etc.; 
uninterrupted, immediate”). 
 221. WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 640 (1981).  
 222. See U.S. Nat’l Bank of Or. v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S. 
439, 455 (1993) (contending that statutory construction “must account for a 
statute’s full text, language as well as punctuation, structure, and subject 
matter”).  
 223. Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 132 (1993). 
 224. See United States v. LSL Biotechnologies, 379 F.3d 672, 692 (9th Cir. 
2004) (Aldisert, J., dissenting) (“Determining the meaning of ‘direct’ requires the 
consideration of definitions as informed by the FTAIA’s context and history.”). 
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causation—rather than temporal or spatial relationships—
because it comports with the FTAIA’s plain language and serves 
the statute’s fundamental goals.225 
2. Plain Language 
The structure of Section 6a(1) supports the position that 
courts should interpret the term direct as a causation concept.226 
The interpretative maxim noscitur a sociis, that “a word is known 
by the company it keeps,” informs the analysis.227 This doctrine is 
applied “where a word is capable of many meanings in order to 
avoid the giving of unintended breadth to the Acts of 
Congress.”228 Thus, direct, as used in the FTAIA, cannot be 
interpreted in isolation—instead, “direct, substantial, and 
reasonably foreseeable” should be read as an integrated 
phrase.229 
Defining direct as a term of causation—meaning not too 
remote—makes sense when the word is read in conjunction with 
the substantiality and foreseeability requirements.230 If direct 
means not too remote, then the three requirements of 
Section 6a(1) are: (1) the effect is not too remote from American 
commerce (direct); (2) the effect makes a meaningful impact on 
such commerce (substantial); and (3) “the effect bears a 
reasonable relationship to the actor’s expectations and was not 
merely serendipitous” (reasonably foreseeable).231  
                                                                                                     
 225. See infra Parts IV.B.2–3 (arguing for defining direct in terms of 
proximate causation). 
 226. See infra notes 227–237 and accompanying text (analyzing the 
provision’s plain language). 
 227. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc., 513 U.S. 561, 575 (1995) (explaining 
the noscitur a sociis doctrine). 
 228. Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307 (1961). 
 229. See Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium Inc., 683 F.3d 845, 857 (7th Cir. 2012) 
(en banc) (suggesting that Congress, in putting the words direct, substantial, 
and foreseeable together, signaled that the words “had to be interpreted as part 
of an integrated phrase”). 
 230. See infra notes 231–237 and accompanying text (explaining why 
remoteness is the better interpretation). 
 231. See Delrahim, supra note 3, at 430 (arguing that the most natural 
reading of direct is as a term of causation). 
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On the other hand, if direct means certainty (as required in 
the immediate consequence test),232 then the reasonably 
foreseeable requirement is robbed of its meaning.233 Reasonably 
foreseeable covers a “broad range of possibilities, from effects that 
are very likely to effects that are not particularly likely but still 
plainly possible.”234 If an effect must be reasonably certain (or at 
least not uncertain), then the effect cannot simultaneously be 
somewhat likely or merely possible.235 Therefore, defining direct 
to mean reasonably certain “drastically shrinks the scope of 
‘reasonably foreseeable’ to the point of rendering that term 
largely meaningless, a result that Congress cannot be presumed 
to have intended.”236 This reading of the FTAIA would violate the 
“cardinal principle of statutory construction” that statutes must 
be construed so that “no clause, sentence, or word should be 
superfluous, void, or insignificant.”237  
3. Consistent with the Purposes of the FTAIA 
Statutory construction is a “holistic endeavor”238 and courts 
must consider a statute’s underlying purpose and policy when 
interpreting a given provision.239 The reasonably proximate 
                                                                                                     
 232. See United States v. LSL Biotechnologies, 379 F.3d 672, 681 (9th Cir. 
2004) (incorporating notion of certainty into the immediate consequence test 
because “[a]n effect cannot be ‘direct’ where it depends on . . . uncertain 
intervening developments”). 
 233. See Lotes Co. v. Hon Hai Precision Indus. Co., 753 F.3d 395, 411 (2d 
Cir. 2014) (“Reading ‘direct’ as ‘immediate’ would rob the separate ‘reasonabl[e] 
foreseeab[ility]’ requirement of any meaningful function . . . .”); Delrahim, supra 
note 3, at 430 (asserting that the concept of “immediate consequence” is not 
reconcilable with the FTAIA’s “reasonably foreseeable” requirement). 
 234. Delrahim, supra note 3, at 430 n.78. 
 235. See id. (contending that reasonably foreseeable encompasses the 
concepts of “somewhat likely” and “merely possible”). 
 236. Id. 
 237. TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) (quoting Duncan v. 
Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 238. United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 
U.S. 365, 371 (1988). 
 239. See U.S. Nat’l Bank of Or. v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S. 
439, 455 (1993) (“Over and over we have stressed that ‘[i]n expounding a 
statute, we must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, 
but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy.’” 
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causal nexus test is more consistent with the FTAIA’s language 
because it aptly addresses antitrust law’s classic concern about 
remote injuries.240 In Alcoa, Judge Learned Hand stressed that 
courts “should not impute to Congress an intent to punish all 
whom its courts can catch, for conduct which has no consequences 
within the United States.”241 The word direct in the FTAIA serves 
to “exclude[] from the Sherman Act foreign activities that are too 
remote from the ultimate effects on U.S. domestic or import 
commerce.”242 Similarly, proximate cause, as used in tort law, 
“cuts off recovery for those whose injuries are too remote from the 
causal event.”243 Interpreting direct to mean proximate cause 
enables the FTAIA to properly exclude remote injuries.244 
Proximate causation, while not easily defined, is essentially a 
flexible concept that, at minimum, requires “some direct relation 
between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged.”245 
Any given injury has “countless causes, and not all should give 
rise to legal liability.”246 Because liability cannot attach to “every 
conceivable harm that can be traced” to the allegedly wrongful 
                                                                                                     
(quoting United States v. Heirs of Boisdoré, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 113, 122 (1850))). 
 240. See Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium Inc., 683 F.3d 845, 857 (7th Cir. 2012) 
(en banc) (articulating that the DOJ’s proximate cause standard is superior to 
the immediate consequences test because it better address remoteness). 
 241. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 
1945). 
 242. Minn-Chem, 683 F.3d at 857. 
 243. Id.; see also CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride, 131 S. Ct. 2630, 2645 (2011) 
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (stating that proximate cause “excludes from the 
scope of liability injuries that are too remote, purely contingent, or indirect” 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 
503 U.S. 258, 268–274 (1992))). 
 244. See supra notes 239–243 and accompanying text (explaining why 
proximate cause properly deals with remote activities that the FTAIA seeks to 
exclude from the Sherman Act’s scope). 
 245. Paroline v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1710, 1719 (2014) (citations 
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. (“The idea of proximate 
cause . . . defies easy summary.”); Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control 
Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1390 (2014) (characterizing the 
“proximate-cause inquiry” as “not easy to define”). 
 246. See CSX Transp., 131 S. Ct. at 2637 (“In a philosophical sense, the 
consequences of an act go forward to eternity, and the causes of an event go back 
to the dawn of human events, and beyond.” (quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., 
PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS § 41, at 264 (5th ed. 1984))); Paroline, 134 S. Ct. at 
1719 (“Every event has many causes . . . and only some of them are proximate, 
as the law uses that term.”). 
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act, proximate cause demands a “causal connection between the 
wrong and the injury.”247 Deeming one event to be the proximate 
cause of another “means that it was not just any cause, but one 
with a sufficient connection to the result.”248 A proximate-cause 
requirement serves to preclude liability for causal connections so 
tenuous that the outcome is better characterized as “mere 
fortuity.”249 
Courts have significant experience with the proximate-cause 
inquiry, and it is a familiar concept in the antitrust world.250 At 
the time of the FTAIA’s enactment, private plaintiffs’ antitrust 
standing treated the concepts of directness and proximate cause 
as comparable.251 Using proximate cause principles, courts today 
continue to evaluate antitrust standing by considering the 
“directness or indirectness of the asserted injury.”252 
The reasonably proximate causal nexus test “incorporates all 
of this useful judicial experience.”253 The doctrine also provides 
the legal vocabulary for “excluding conduct deemed too remote 
from its injurious effect.”254 Interpreting direct to mean 
proximate cause further serves the overall purpose of U.S. 
antitrust law—to protect American consumers from the harmful 
consequences of anticompetitive conduct.255 By requiring a causal 
                                                                                                     
 247. Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of 
Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 533 n.26 (1983). 
 248. Paroline, 134 S. Ct. at 1719 (emphasis added). 
 249. Id. (citation omitted). 
 250. See Lotes Co. v. Hon Hai Precision Indus. Co., 753 F.3d 395, 412 (2d 
Cir. 2014) (“[C]ourts have long applied notions of proximate causation, using the 
language of ‘directness,’ in determining what types of injuries the antitrust laws 
may properly redress.”). 
 251. See Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 476 nn.12–13 (1982) 
(discussing historical antitrust standing inquiries that equated remoteness with 
directness and characterizing the terms as analogous to the concept of 
proximate cause). 
 252. See Associated Gen. Contractors, 459 U.S. at 540 (analyzing antitrust 
standing by evaluating the directness of the injury); Blue Shield, 457 U.S. at 
476–77 & n.13 (using a proximate-cause analysis to determine when “a 
particular injury is too remote” to warrant antitrust standing). 
 253. Lotes, 753 F.3d at 398. 
 254. Id. at 412.  
 255. See United States v. LSL Biotechnologies, 379 F.3d 672, 693 (9th Cir. 
2004) (Aldisert, J., dissenting) (describing the Sherman Act’s “fundamental 
purpose” as “protect[ing] United States consumers from the consequences of 
anticompetitive conduct”); see also United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 
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connection between any alleged foreign wrongdoing and the 
injurious effect, the FTAIA excludes conduct with only remote 
injuries and thereby allows the Sherman Act to focus on conduct 
that sufficiently harms U.S. commerce.256  
4. Weaknesses of the Reasonably Proximate Causal Nexus Test 
While the reasonably proximate causal nexus test is superior 
to the immediate consequence test, it is not without flaws.257 
Because the test is less stringent than the immediate 
consequence standard, it is vulnerable to exceedingly liberal 
interpretations, which “risks unreasonable interference with the 
sovereignty of foreign countries.”258 The proximate cause doctrine 
is “notoriously slippery” and nebulous.259  
The proximate causal nexus test also requires a 
fact-intensive analysis to determine whether the conduct and 
domestic effect are sufficiently direct.260 It will depend on factors 
such as “the structure of the market and the nature of the 
commercial relationships at each link in the causal chain.”261 The 
reasonably proximate causal nexus test could lead to uncertainty 
                                                                                                     
596, 610 (1972) 
Antitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in particular, are the 
Magna Carta of free enterprise. They are as important to the 
preservation of economic freedom and our free-enterprise system as 
the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our fundamental personal 
freedoms. And the freedom guaranteed each and every business, no 
matter how small, is the freedom to compete—to assert with vigor, 
imagination, devotion, and ingenuity whatever economic muscle it 
can muster. 
 256. See supra notes 238–255 and accompanying text (detailing how a 
proximate cause standard helps the FTAIA serve its intended purposes). 
 257. See infra notes 258–262 and accompanying text (describing the 
weaknesses of the test). 
 258. Recent Case, Antitrust—Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act—
Second Circuit Adopts Minn-Chem Test for Domestic Effects—Lotes Co. v. Hon 
Hai Precision Industry Co., 753 F.3d 395 (2d Cir. 2014), 128 HARV. L. REV. 759, 
759 (2014). 
 259. See Lotes Co. v. Hon Hai Precision Indus. Co., 753 F.3d 395, 412 (2d 
Cir. 2014) (discussing proximate causation). 
 260. See Recent Case, supra note 258, at 763–64 (critiquing the reasonably 
proximate causal nexus test). 
 261. Lotes, 753 F.3d at 413. 
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because any analysis will be case-specific and therefore more 
difficult for companies to gauge their exposure to antitrust 
liabilities.262  
V. Policy Considerations 
Courts need to adopt an interpretation of the term direct that 
both reflects a loyal construction of the FTAIA and also addresses 
antitrust infractions in the context of an increasingly global 
economy. The standard should “mitigate friction between 
different nations’ antitrust regimes and provide more clarity to 
foreign actors.”263 
Due to the FTAIA’s ambiguity and the “myriad of fact 
patterns that can arise,” policy considerations will likely “play a 
large role in ultimately deciding the scope of the FTAIA.”264 
Comity concerns are even more important today because many 
countries now have their own antitrust enforcement regimes—the 
United States is not the only competition watchdog anymore.265 
                                                                                                     
 262. See Recent Case, supra note 258, at 764 (“[A] proximate cause standard 
does not provide useful guidance to individual and corporate actors in foreign 
markets. . . . [T]hey must constantly evaluate whether their actions have 
‘proximate effects’ on U.S. markets—if this impact can be determined ex ante at 
all.”). 
 263. Id. at 759. 
 264. Robert Connolly, Why Motorola Mobility Was a Good Decision for 
Global Cartel Enforcement, CARTEL CAPERS (Feb. 6, 2015), 
http://cartelcapers.com/blog/motorola-mobility-good-decision-global-cartel-enforce 
ment/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 265. See Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., 775 F.3d 816, 826 
(7th Cir. 2015) (“No longer is the United States ‘the world’s competition 
policeman,’ as it used to be called, because other nations have stricter antitrust 
laws, in some respects, than ours.”), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2837 (2015); see also 
Scott D. Hammond, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, Address at the 56th Annual Spring Meeting of the ABA Section of 
Antitrust Law: Recent Developments, Trends, and Milestones in the Antitrust 
Division’s Criminal Enforcement Program 18 (Mar. 26, 2008), 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/232716.pdf (“Seemingly with each 
passing day, the antitrust community learns of a foreign government that has 
enacted a new antitrust law, created a new cartel investigative unit, obtained a 
record antitrust fine, or adopted a new corporate leniency program.”); Andreas 
Mundt, Chair, Int’l Competition Network, Focus, Inclusiveness and 
Implementation—The ICN as a Key Factor for Global Convergence in 
Competition Law 2 (Sept. 5, 2013), http://internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/ 
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Governmental antitrust enforcement has proliferated around the 
world.266 In 2014, global penalties for price-fixing reached a 
record-breaking total of $5.3 billion—thirty-one percent more 
than the 2013 total.267 For comparison, the DOJ Antitrust 
Division issued penalties totaling $861.4 million in the 2014 fiscal 
year268 and $1.02 billion in the 2013 fiscal year.269 
Competition authorities in Asia issued record-level antitrust 
fines of over $1.7 billion in 2014.270 This represents a significant 
increase when compared to Asian fines in prior years—the 2013 
penalties totaled $1.2 billion, and the average of the previous five 
years (2008–2012) also equaled $1.2 billion.271 This dramatic rise 
in enforcement in Asia comes as authorities “have become 
increasingly emboldened by maturing competition laws—many of 
which are only a few years old.”272 
                                                                                                     
uploads/library/doc924.pdf (noting that the International Competition Network 
now has 126 agency members from 111 jurisdictions). 
 266. See Robert E. Connolly, Why the Motorola Mobility Decision was Good 
for Cartel Enforcement and Deterrence, CPI ANTITRUST CHRON., Jan. 2015, at 3–
4 (describing the “dramatic” increase in antitrust prosecutions and fines); see 
also supra note 265 and accompanying text (noting expansion in number of 
governmental enforcement regimes); infra notes 267–272 and accompanying 
text (discussing increased enforcement). 
 267. Caroline Binham, Global Fines for Price-Fixing Hit $5.3bn Record 
High, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2015, 4:44 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/ 
cms/s/0/83c27142-95a8-11e4-b3a6-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3RT9wzz1A (last 
visited Nov. 16, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 268. ALLEN & OVERY, GLOBAL CARTEL ENFORCEMENT: 2014 YEAR IN REVIEW 4 
(2015), http://www.allenovery.com/publications/en-gb/Documents/Cartel%20re 
port.pdf. The DOJ’s fiscal year runs from October to September. Id. 
 269. Division Update Spring 2014, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., http://www. 
justice.gov/atr/division-update/2014/division-update-spring-2014 (last visited 
Nov. 16, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 270. See Peter Dahl, Asia Antitrust Watchdogs Issue Record Fines, DW (Jan. 
8, 2015), http://www.dw.de/asia-antitrust-watchdogs-issue-record-fines/a-18 
176691 (last visited Nov. 16, 2015) (reporting Asian antitrust penalties in 2014) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Competition Law 
Developments in East Asia—December 2014, NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT (Dec. 
2014), http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/cn/knowledge/publications/124572/ 
competition-law-developments-in-east-asia-december-2014 (last visited Nov. 16, 
2015) (same) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 271. See Competition Law Developments in East Asia—December 2014, 
supra note 270 (summarizing antitrust fines in East Asia). 
 272. Dahl, supra note 270.  
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International enforcement cooperation “has dramatically 
changed the landscape from the days when a company could fix 
prices worldwide and face significant sanctions in very few 
jurisdictions.”273 Cooperation among competition agencies is vital 
to effective detection and prosecution of anticompetitive 
behavior.274 Best efforts and “cooperation from foreign 
governments in global investigations” have greatly aided the 
DOJ’s ability to punish anticompetitive activity.275 Because 
governmental prosecutions serve as a primary deterrent to 
anticompetitive conduct, they are an essential component of 
global cartel enforcement.276 Thus, maintaining cooperative 
relationships with foreign agencies is necessary to deter illegal 
behavior.277 Mutual trust and respect among competition 
agencies are crucial to preserving this close cooperation.278  
The reasonably proximate causal nexus standard has the 
flexibility and breadth to encompass the policy concern of 
maintaining international enforcement cooperation. In applying 
the reasonably proximate causal nexus test, courts should 
interpret the word direct narrowly in light of the important 
comity considerations.279 Treble damages often entice private 
                                                                                                     
 273. Connolly, supra note 264. For example, numerous jurisdictions 
initiated enforcement actions in the LCD cartel investigation, including the 
United States, European Union, Korea, Canada, Brazil, China, and Japan. Id. 
 274. See id. (“This cooperation takes many forms, both seen (coordinated 
dawn raids, MLAT treaties, extradition) and unseen (sharing of information).”); 
see also Hammond, supra note 265, at 18 (stating that the “shared commitment” 
among competition enforcement authorities “to fighting international cartels 
has led to the establishment of cooperative relationships . . . in order to more 
effectively investigate and prosecute international cartels”).  
 275. Connolly, supra note 266, at 2; see also Hammond, supra note 265, at 
18 (noting that “cooperation and assistance . . . from foreign governments, and 
from their own enforcement efforts,” have enhanced the DOJ’s enforcement 
capabilities). 
 276. See Hammond, supra note 265, at 2 (“The Division has long emphasized 
that the most effective way to deter and punish cartel activity is to hold culpable 
individuals accountable by seeking jail sentences.”).  
 277. See Connolly, supra note 264 (emphasizing the importance of 
international enforcement cooperation). 
 278. Id. (discussing how to maintain enforcement cooperation).  
 279. This comports with the Supreme Court’s prior warning that “rampant 
extraterritorial application of U.S. law ‘creates a serious risk of interference 
with a foreign nation’s ability to independently regulate its own commercial 
affairs.’” Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., 775 F.3d 816, 824 (7th 
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plaintiffs, but courts must not allow this temptation to infringe 
on foreign sovereigns’ interests in punishing antitrust violations 
that occur within their own borders.280 Courts must also be 
conscious of the significant differences between actions initiated 
by the DOJ and damages actions brought by private plaintiffs.281 
The DOJ, acting on behalf of the U.S. government, clearly “has 
reason to weigh comity and sovereignty concerns when bringing 
international . . . cartel case[s].”282 Private plaintiffs, on the other 
hand, do not.283  
Courts should construe the antitrust laws, including the 
FTAIA, so as to avoid undue encroachment into other nations’ 
sovereign authority and legitimate interests.284 The Supreme 
Court has cautioned against overreaching, which poses a “serious 
risk of interference with a foreign nation’s ability to 
independently regulate its own commercial affairs.”285 The 
proximate causation doctrine, while admittedly amorphous, 
allows for accommodation of comity concerns because it is not a 
rigid and fixed standard.286 The reasonably proximate causal 
                                                                                                     
Cir. 2015) (quoting F. Hoffman–La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 
165 (2004)). 
 280. See F. Hoffman–La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 164 
(2004) (citations omitted) (directing statutory construction that “avoid[s] 
unreasonable interference with the sovereign authority of other nations”). 
 281. See Motorola Mobility, 775 F.3d at 826–27 (citing Robert E. Connolly, 
Repeal the FTAIA! (Or at Least Consider it as Coextensive with Harford Fire), 
CPI ANTITRUST CHRON., Sept. 2014, at 3 (discussing problems with private 
antitrust suits). 
 282. Id. at 826 (citing Robert Connolly, Motorola Mobility and the FTAIA, 
CARTEL CAPERS (Sept. 30, 2014), http://cartelcapers.com/blog/motorola-mobility-
ftaia/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review)). 
 283. Id. (citing Robert Connolly, Motorola Mobility and the FTAIA, CARTEL 
CAPERS (Sept. 30, 2014), http://cartelcapers.com/blog/motorola-mobility-ftaia/ 
(last visited Nov. 16, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review)). 
 284. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 
582 (1986) (emphasizing that “American antitrust laws do not regulate the 
competitive conditions of other nations’ economies”); see also Empagran, 542 
U.S. at 165 (“Why should American law supplant, for example, Canada’s or 
Great Britain’s or Japan’s own determination about how to best protect 
Canadian or British or Japanese customers from anticompetitive conduct 
engaged in significant part by Canadian or British or Japanese or other foreign 
companies?”). 
 285. Id. at 165. 
 286. Supra Part IV.B. 
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nexus test permits comprehensive evaluations and affords courts 
the ability to properly consider a foreign sovereign’s authority 
when analyzing whether foreign conduct may be redressed in the 
United States. 
VI. Conclusion 
Courts should adopt the Second and Seventh Circuit’s 
reasonably proximate causal nexus test because it is superior 
standard to the immediate consequence test.287 It has the 
flexibility to address the increasingly complex nature of global 
commerce and the rapidly evaporating international trade 
barriers.288 The reasonably proximate causal nexus test is a loyal 
construction of the statute’s plain language because it does not 
render any word meaningless. It also serves the FTAIA’s 
fundamental goal of protecting domestic commerce.289 
Furthermore, the test affords courts the opportunity to 
incorporate comity concerns into their analyses.290 While not a 
perfect standard, the reasonably proximate causal nexus test is 
currently the best option because it allows for zealous 
enforcement of the antitrust laws, as well as respectful 
consideration of the legitimate interests of foreign nations. 
                                                                                                     
 287. Supra Parts IV.B.1–3. 
 288. See Lotes Co. v. Hon Hai Precision Indus. Co., 753 F.3d 395, 412–13 (2d 
Cir. 2014) (asserting that proximate causation can address the “kind of complex 
manufacturing process [that] is increasingly common in our modern global 
economy”). 
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 290. Supra Part V. 
